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Abstract
Many recent models of trade dynamics use the simple idea of wealth exchanges
among economic agents in order to obtain a stable or equilibrium distribution of
wealth among the agents. In particular, a plain analogy compares the wealth in
a society with the energy in a physical system, and the trade between agents to
the energy exchange between molecules during collisions. In physical systems,
the energy exchange among molecules leads to a state of equipartition of the
energy and to an equilibrium situation where the entropy is a maximum. On
the other hand, in the majority of exchange models, the system converges to
a very unequal condensed state, where one or a few agents concentrate all the
wealth of the society while the wide majority of agents shares zero or almost
zero fraction of the wealth. So, in those economic systems a minimum entropy
state is attained. We propose here an analytical model where we investigate the
effects of a particular class of economic exchanges that minimize the entropy.
By solving the model we discuss the conditions that can drive the system to
a state of minimum entropy, as well as the mechanisms to recover a kind of
equipartition of wealth.
Keywords: exchange models, wealth and income distribution, poverty,
maximum extropy, thermodynamics second law, inequalities
JEL codes: D31, C62, C63, I32
1. Introduction
The second law of thermodynamics states that isolated systems always tend
to an equilibrium state of maximum entropy, where equilibrium means that the
macroscopic properties of the system are the same in any part of it. The second
law of thermodynamics can also be deduced from an analysis of the efficiency
of a thermal engine, and according to Clausius: “No process is possible whose
sole result is the transfer of heat from a body of lower temperature to a body
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of higher temperature” [1] In modern statistical physics the second law may be
inferred from Boltzmann H-theorem [1] and it is generally accepted as a natural
consequence of the energy exchange among molecules in the kinetic theory of
gases: when molecules collide in a gas there is a transfer of kinetic energy from
the more energetic to the less energetic molecules and, as a consequence, after
a transient, all molecules share, in average, the same energy. This result is the
theorem of equipartition of energy that characterizes the Maxwell-Boltzmann
equilibrium distribution of velocities, and it is associated with the maximum
entropy state. However, in particular situations, it may happen that the en-
tropy decreases as a function of time; examples are self-organized systems and
biological organisms. One common characteristic of those systems is that they
are not in equilibrium even if they seem stable or stationary in time [2].
The idea that economic systems also possess some kind of equilibrium state
is an underlying concept in classical economic theory, going from Pareto opti-
mality to Nash equilibrium [3]. The Edgeworth box model is an example of
how a simple exchange conservative model can lead two consumers to optimize
their respective utility [3]. But in other cases there are symptomatic evidences
that economic systems can be out of equilibrium and/or exhibit metastable
equilibrium states. This is the case when studying the wealth and income dis-
tribution. Fluctuations around an equilibrium state behave in a Gaussian or
normal way: The probability of rare events is very small, as the Gaussian distri-
bution exhibits exponential tails. On the other hand, empirical studies focusing
the income distribution of workers, companies and countries were first presented
more than a century ago by Vilfredo Pareto and he discovered that the income
distribution does not behave in a Gaussian way but exhibits “heavy tails”, i.e.
the cumulative probability P (w) of workers whose income is at least w follows
a power law [4] given by P (w) ∝ w−β . Nowadays, this power law distribution
is known as Pareto distribution, and the corresponding exponent β is named
Pareto exponent. However, recent data indicates that, even though Pareto dis-
tribution provides a good fit in the high income range, it does not agree with
the observed data over the middle and low income range. For instance, data
from Japan [5, 6], Italy [7], India [8], the United States of America and the
United Kingdom [9, 10, 11] are fitted by a log-normal or Boltzmann distribu-
tion with the maximum located at the middle-income region plus a power law
for the high-income strata. The existence of these two regimes may be justified
in a qualitative way by stating that in the low and middle income classes the
process of wealth accumulation is additive (and mainly due to wages), causing
a Gaussian-like distribution, while in the high income range, wealth grows in a
multiplicative way, generating the observed power law tail [6].
In recent years physicists and economists working in complexity science pro-
posed different mathematical models of wealth exchange among economic agents
in order to try to explain these empirical data (For a review see refs. [12, 13, 14]).
Quoting ref. [12]: Inspired by Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of collisions in gases,
econophysicists introduced an alternative two-body approach, where agents per-
form pairwise economic transactions and transfer money from one agent to
another. Actually, this approach was pioneered by the sociologist John An-
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gle [15, 16]. Most of these models consider an ensemble of interacting eco-
nomic agents, each one possessing a given amount of endowments, money[9] or
assets[14, 17] that represents its economics resources and that we will describe
as “wealth”. Most of these models focus on one particular aspect of economic
processes: The competition among different agents (countries, enterprises, etc.)
acting in an environment where all exchanges of wealth between agents take
place in a conservative manner, i.e., a conservative exchange market model
(CEMM)[18]. This restriction has several motivations: On the one hand, it can
be argued that resources are material objects, and consequently they cannot be
created or destroyed by means of exchanging them. On the other hand, the use
of the CEMM implies that the exchange model is a zero-sum game, something
that may seem at odds with usual economic orthodoxy. However, the results
also hold for systems in which the total amount of wealth increases uniformly
and smoothly in time. The interaction among agents consists in a exchange of a
fixed [9] or random [14, 17] amount of their wealth. The process of exchange is
similar to the collision of molecules in a gas and the amount of exchanged wealth
when two agents interact corresponds to some economic “energy” that may be
transferred for one agent to another. If this exchanged amount corresponds to
a fixed or random fraction of one of the interacting agents wealth, the resulting
wealth distribution is – unsurprisingly – a Gibbs exponential distribution [9].
Aiming at obtaining distributions with power law tails, in order to describe
the higher income region of the wealth distribution histogram, several methods
have been proposed mostly introducing a multiplicative risk aversion that acts
as a multiplicative noise. Numerical results[14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], as well
as some analytical calculations [25, 26], indicate that a frequent outcome in
these models is condensation, i.e. concentration of all available wealth in just
one or a few agents. This final state corresponds to a kind of equipartition
of poverty: All agents (except for a set of zero measure) possess zero wealth
while one, or a few ones, concentrate all available resources. In any case the
final configuration is a stationary state of “equilibrium”, since agents with zero
wealth cannot participate in further exchanges. Several methods have been
proposed to avoid this situation, for instance, exchange rules where the poorer
agents are favored [8, 14, 24, 26, 27] or taxes and regulations [28, 29]. Here,
instead, we are mainly interested in the condensed state and in the dynamics
driving the system to this condensed state, as well as in the entropy behavior
when the system approaches condensation.
As previously stated, exchange rules are determinant of the long-time be-
havior of the system. While we can obtain an exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution - and consequently a maximum entropy state - if the exchanged
fraction is fixed or determined at random, condensation is the outcome when
exchange rules are so that, when two agents interact, the exchanged amount
∆w is proportional to the wealth of one of the participants or to both [25] but
in no case one participant can win more that the value he put in stake. So, the
exchange process is a kind of lottery where no agent can win more than his own
possessions. One particular and widely used exchange rule is to consider that
the fraction of transferred wealth from agent x′ to agent x′′, or vice versa, is:
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∆w = min{(1−λ)w′; (1−λ)w′′}, where w′ and w′′ are the respective wealth of
the two interacting agents, and λ is a risk-aversion factor, so the capital frac-
tion that the agents risk during the exchange is 1 − λ [14, 24, 26]. It is worth
noting that even approaching a condensed state, in the intermediate stages the
wealth distribution goes through a series of power law distributions where the
Pareto exponent increases as a function of time [26]. The problem with the
previous definition of ∆w is that it involves a logical comparison that is difficult
to be treated analytically. Here we consider another form of ∆w. We define
an analytical expression of ∆w that guarantees that no agent participating in
the exchange risk more than the quantity he can win. To do that we define
∆w = w
′w′′
w′+w′′ , that presents similar properties and is equal to the wealth of the
poorer partner when the wealth of the richer agents is much bigger than the
other. Notice also that we eliminated the risk-aversion factor, just by consider-
ing λ = 0, because we have verified that one does not need the multiplicative
noise to obtain the condensed state. Using this exchange rule and the methods
of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics we show in this paper that the entropy
decreases in the intermediate stages leading to a condensed state of minimum
entropy (and maximum inequality, Gini coefficient equal to 1).
The text is organized as follows: in the next section we write the exchange
model in the form of a master equation that is solved by numerical iteration in
section 3. Next in section 4 we calculate the entropy of the system as well as
the Theil coefficient and we discuss why in this case the Boltzmann H-theorem
is not verified. Finally the results are discussed and the conclusions presented
in section 5.
2. The evolution equation
We consider a collection of R individuals, each one characterized by a given
value of a continuous variable w. This variable can represent the wealth, cash,
properties, or some other measure of the agent’s fortune, but it can also repre-
sent a physical scalar quantity, as energy. Like in the kinetic theory of gases,
agents may interact and exchange any fraction of w. In the standard kinetic
theory the exchange of random fractions of energy leads to an equilibrium state
described by Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution[1]. In the same way, considering
w as representing the money owned by an agent, and random exchanges between
agents, a maxwellian money distribution is also found[9, 10, 18, 19]. However,
as previously stated, different exchange mechanisms can be considered. Several
of them are in some way proportional to the wealth owned by the participating
agents and leads to a condensed state[14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Here we study
a very simple non-linear exchange rule. Let us consider two agents, with wealth
w′ and w′′, respectively. We assume that when they interact they exchange
∆w = (w′w′′)/(w′ + w′′). It implies that when the two agents have very simi-
lar wealth, the exchanged amount is approximately half of each agent wealth,
while if the possessions are very different, the transferred amount is equal to the
poorer agent’s wealth. This expression yields a fair exchange rule in the sense
that no agent risks more that the amount he can win. Indeed the rule is very
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similar to the one used in refs. [14, 24], i.e. w = min{w,w′} but here we avoid
the logical operator using an analytical expression.
We also aim at investigating the effect of favoring the poorer agent in an in-
teraction. Condensation of wealth is an undesirable effect in models describing
wealth distribution and many authors proposed different ingredients to avoid
this effect. One of the most popular recipes is to define a wealth-dependent
probability of winning a transaction. For example in refs. [8, 14, 24, 26, 27] it
is assumed that the winning probability is higher for the poorer participating
agent. Even if this recipe seems counterintuitive, favoring the poorer agent in
every transaction somehow emulates a regulatory policy imposed by a govern-
ment. To assess the effects of this kind of policy, we assume that in an interaction
between two agents with wealth w′ and w′′, the probability pγ(w
′|w′′) that the
agent with wealth w′ wins the exchanged amount, ∆w = (w′w′′)/(w′ + w′′), is
given by
pγ(w
′|w′′) =
1
2
[1− γ tanh (w′ − w′′)] , (1)
where γ may assume any value in the interval [0, 1]. This winning probability
has the following properties
• pγ(w
′|w′′) = 12 , if w
′ = w′′ for all γ.
• pγ(w
′|w′′) = 12 , if γ = 0 for all w
′ and w′′.
• pγ(w
′|w′′) = 12 (1∓ γ), if w
′ − w′′ → ±∞, so 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
• pγ(w
′|w′′) + pγ(w
′′|w′) = 1, for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, w′, and w′′.
Hence, by varying γ we can investigate the effects of a varying the winning
probability on the wealth distribution.
We define N(w, t)dw as the probability of finding an agent with wealth
in the interval [w,w + dw] at time t or, alternatively, as the relative number
of agents with wealth in that interval. From now on, we consider the limit
where there is an infinite number of agents, such that N(w, t) is a continuous
function of w. The wealth evolution of such agents depend on their transactions.
Assuming that i) the probability per unit time that two agents of wealth w and
w′ perform a transaction is given by k N(w, t)N(w′, t) dw dw′, with k being the
transaction frequency; ii) the exchanged wealth in that transaction is ∆w =
(w′w′′)/(w′ + w′′); and iii) the probability of gaining or loosing that amount
is given by a regulatory function pγ(w
′|w′′) given by Eq.(1); we may write the
evolution equation for N(w, t) as
N(w, t+∆t)−N(w, t) = −2 k N(w, t)
+k
∫ ∞
0
dw′
∫ ∞
0
dw′′N(w′, t)N(w′′, t)
{
pγ(w
′|w′′) δ
(
w −
[
w′ +
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
])
+ pγ(w
′′|w′) δ
(
w −
[
w′ −
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
])
+ pγ(w
′′|w′) δ
(
w −
[
w′′ +
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
])
+ pγ(w
′|w′′) δ
(
w −
[
w′′ −
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
])}
. (2)
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This is a non-linear probability conservation equation. The first term in the
right hand side of Eq.(2) gives the amount of agents that have changed from
w to some other value. This term is proportional to the total number K(w) of
transactions involving agents with wealth in the range (w,w + dw), during the
time interval dt, which is given by
K(w) = k
∫ ∞
0
dw′
∫ ∞
0
dw′′N(w′, t)N(w′′, t) [δ(w′ − w) + δ(w′′ − w)] (3)
= 2 k N(w, t),
and where we have explicitly taken into account the normalization of N(w, t),
that is,
∫∞
0
dwN(w, t) = 1. The other four terms in Eq.(2) describe the in-
crement in N(w, t) due to agents that changed their wealth to w (by winning
money, first and third terms, or by losing money, second and fourth terms) dur-
ing dt. The conservation of number of agents is easily verified by integrating
Eq.(2) in w. The total wealth is also conserved. As the number of agents is con-
served, wealth conservation is demonstrated by showing that the time derivative
of the average wealth is zero:
d
dt
〈w〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dw w
∂N(w, t)
∂t
= 0, (4)
Using Eq.(2) to estimate the time derivative of N(w, t) and performing the
integrals containing δ-functions we obtain
∫ ∞
0
dw w [N(w, t+∆t)−N(w, t)] =
−2k
∫ ∞
0
dw wN(w, t) +
∫ ∞
0
dw′
∫ ∞
0
dw′′N(w′, t)N(w′′, t)k ×
{
pγ(w
′|w′′)
[
w′ +
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
]
+ pγ(w
′′|w′)
[
w′ −
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
]
+pγ(w
′′|w′)
[
w′′ +
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
]
+ pγ(w
′|w′′)
[
w′′ −
w′ w′′
w′ + w′′
]}
= 0, (5)
implying a constant average wealth. We use wealth and number of agents
conservation to define the wealth unit as the average wealth given by 〈w〉 =∫∞
0 dww N(w, t)/
∫∞
0 dwN(w, t). In what follows wealth is given in units of
average wealth 〈w〉.
3. Numerical iteration
The evolution equation, Eq.2, has been numerically iterated by dividing the
w axis in bins of width < w > /100, while the exchange rate k is taken as
k = 0.01/τ with τ being the simulation time step. We have considered two
different initial conditions:
• a normal distribution with average 〈w〉 and variance 〈w〉/6.
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• an uniform distribution in the interval [0, 2〈w〉].
We first analyze the symmetric case, where γ = 0, such that in each transaction
the winning probability is 1/2 for both agents. Fig. 1 shows the time evolution
in both cases, Fig. 1(a) for a normal initial distribution and Fig. 1(b) for a
uniform initial distribution. It is interesting to note that after some initial
oscillations, more pronounced for the case of the normal distribution (because
at the beginning of the simulation the exchanged amounts are always very near
< w > /2) the system arrives to the same distribution. This final distribution
evolves to the condensed state. It is characterized by a very small fraction of
agents with wealth above < w >, and an ever increasing number of agents with
wealth very near zero. However, it is worth to note that the transient states
present a clear exponential tail (and not power law), as one can see in the log-
linear plots presented in Fig. (2, where the distributions are represented by a
linearly decreasing function with an slope, −ζ, that corresponds to the exponent
of the distribution. This exponent decreases with time as shown in Fig. (2).
One expects that for t → ∞ the exponent goes to zero, indicating that all the
agents have zero wealth. Nevertheless, as the total wealth is conserved a finite
set of agents (one or a few, but in any case a zero-measure set) possess all the
available resources On the other hand, the interval on the w axis where N(w, t)
is described by an exponential increases with time, and ranges from w of the
order of 〈w〉 to a higher value of w that increases in time. After that, N(w, t)dw
decreases very fast to values much smaller than 10−9 implying that it is very
unlikely that a system described by that N(w, t) would present agents in the
high wealth interval. We call this distribution, where the number of agents
goes to infinity for w going to zero, and goes to zero for any finite wealth, an
L−shaped distribution.
Condensation of wealth is an effect undesirable in models describing wealth
distribution as well as in real societies. So, many authors proposed different
mechanisms in order to avoid or compensate this effect. One of the most “pop-
ular” recipes is to define a wealth-dependent probability of being the winner
in the transaction. For example in refs. [27, 24, 14, 8, 26] it is assumed that
the probability of being the winner in a transaction is higher for the agent with
the lower wealth in each interaction. Even if this recipe seems counterintuitive,
increasing the probability of favoring the poorer agent is a way to simulate the
action of the state or of some another type of regulatory tool aiming to re-
distribute the resources. In order to verify the effect of this kind of measure,
here we will consider an asymmetric winning probability, by taking 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
in Eq.(1). The iteration results for a uniform initial distribution are shown in
Fig. 4, where we extended the iteration time from 800 to 3200 timesteps. The
results for other initial conditions are similar, as it was for the γ = 0 case. How-
ever, even considering values of γ 6= 0, as time evolves the distribution N(w)
tends to an L-shaped distribution where all agents concentrate at w = 0, with
an infinitesimal number of agents presenting w > 0: all distributions exhibit
peaks for w = 0 as time increases. The exception happens for γ = 1, when the
peak in the distribution located at w > 0, is stable and increases as time goes
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Figure 1: Plot of the wealth distribution at different times for (a) an initial normal distribution,
(b) an initial uniform distribution.
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Figure 2: Log-linear plot of the wealth distribution at different times for (a) an initial normal
distribution, (b) an initial uniform distribution.
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Figure 3: The exponent of the wealth distribution as a function of time for different initial
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Figure 4: Plot of the wealth distribution for 0 < γ ≤ 1 at different times for an initial normal
distribution.
by. In this case the wealth distribution approaches a shape that is well fitted by
a Gaussian or lognormal function. Nevertheless, it is clear from Fig. 4 that for
bigger enough values of γ the time for arriving to condensation is also bigger,
so, for finite periods of time, increasing γ diminish inequality.
The fact that for γ < 1 the system converges to condensation when t → ∞
can be explained because when an agent reaches the miserable state, with w ∼= 0,
it no longer participates in the transactions, since in transactions involving
w = 0-agents the exchanged amounts are always zero. It means that the w = 0
state acts as a trap of zero escaping probability: and it is just a question of
time for the system to reach a state where all agents concentrate at the total
misery state. The only case when this situation does not happen is when γ = 1
because, in this case, the poorer agent always wins such that the system is
driven towards a kind of equipartition of wealth. Fig. 5 illustrates this point by
presenting the evolution of N(w = 0) with time, for different values of γ. The
fraction of miserable agents remains finite, as in the initial state, only for γ = 1.
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Figure 5: Plot of N(w = 0) with time for normal initial condition and different values of γ
.
3.1. Entropy evolution: the second law
To quantitatively characterize the degree of inequality of the distribution we
consider different estimators. Inequality is generally estimated by either using
Gini coefficient [31], whose calculation is presented at the end of this section, or
the Shannon entropy, known by economists as the Theil coefficient [32]. Here, in
order to compare with a more typical thermodynamical variable, we also calcu-
late the usual entropy of the system. We begin by calculating the conventional
entropy, in the way it is defined in Statistical Physics textbooks [1]:
S = −
∫ ∞
0
N(w, t) logN(w, t). (6)
The time evolution of the entropy is given by
dS
dt
= −
d
dt
∫ ∞
0
N(w, t) logN(w, t)
=
∫ ∞
0
∂N(w, t)
∂t
logN(w, t) (7)
and using equation 2, we obtain
dS
dt
= −k
∫ ∞
0
dw′
∫ ∞
0
dw′′N(w′, t)N(w′′, t)
× log

N
(
w′ + w
′w′′
w′+w′′ , t
)1−γ tanh(w′−w′′)
N
(
w′ − w
′w′′
w′+w′′ , t
)1+γ tanh(w′−w′′)
N(w′t)N(w′′, t)


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Even if, for γ = 0, a Boltzmann-like distribution with an effective temperature
proportional to < w >, that is, N(w) = e
− w
〈w〉
〈w〉 , yields
dS
dt = 0, a visual inspec-
tion of Fig. 2 suggests that this is not the stationary solution for long times
even for γ 6= 0: the wealth distribution clearly exhibits an exponential behavior
for intermediate and low values of w. Alternatively, there exists another type
of function that presents norm 1, average 〈w〉 = 1, and leads to dS
dt
= 0. This
function is also compatible with the asymptotic stationary solution (as indicated
by numerical simulations for γ < 1), and is a stationary solution of Eq..(2). One
possible function with these properties type is:
Nst(w, t) = lim
wmax→∞


1− 2〈w〉
wmax
if w = 0
2〈w〉
w2
max
if 0 < w ≤ wmax
0 if w > wmax
(8)
This solution describes condensation that, even if from an economic point of view
is the worst possible scenario, corresponds to the numerical results obtained in
this work as well as in the references quoted above. The solution is also the
attractor of the dynamic of the system:
• Due to the dynamics of the system wmax is always increasing. So it tends
to infinity for time going to infinity.
• The fraction of the agents populations with w = 0 grows as 1− 2〈w〉
wmax
and
hence tends to 1 as wmax →∞.
• The total wealth concentrates in the infinitesimal population fraction,
given by 2〈w〉
wmax
having w > 0, which goes to zero as time goes to infin-
ity.
We call this solution “condensate solution”. The entropy evolution for the
iterated distributions is presented in Fig. 6. For γ < 1 the entropy initially
increases, corresponding to the spreading of the distribution function. However,
when the number of agents with zero wealth increases to very high values, the
entropy decreases, indicating an ordered state: condensation of the agents in the
w = 0 state. This is compatible with the proposed attractor, Eq.. 8. It is worth
to note that the entropy decreases, and not increases, in time. We may explain
this by the fact that for any initial w, an agent has a non-zero probability of
continuously loosing wealth, being attracted to the total misery condition with
w = 0 when t → ∞. From that state it is not possible to escape. Thus, the
condensed state plays the role of a zero escaping probability trap in a random
walk and is also an ordered state with minimum entropy.
4. Minimum entropy: the second law for markets
4.1. Theil entropy
The entropy defined in the previous subsection corresponds to the usual
Shannon entropy defined in Physics textbooks when considering the probability
12
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Figure 6: Time evolution of the entropy for different values of γ and two different initial
conditions.
13
of finding an agent with a given wealth: it corresponds to the integral of the
product of the wealth distribution times its logarithm. An alternative entropy
function may be defined considering the probability of finding a given fraction
of wealth with a given agent. To do this we consider the summation (or the
integral) of the wealth times its logarithm, and this is the entropy (or inequality
coefficient) defined by Theil [32] that we will call here Theil entropy, represented
as SW .
ConsiderWT as the total wealth of the system and wi as the wealth belonging
to agent i. Hence wi
WT
is the fraction of the total wealth that belongs to agent
i, or the probability that a given portion of wealth belongs to agent i. This
distribution function is normalized:∑
i
wi
WT
= 1, (9)
and we may define the Theil entropy, SW , regarding this distribution function:
SW = −
∑
i
wi
WT
log
(
wi
WT
)
. (10)
SW may be calculated using N(w, t) as follows:
SW = −NT
∫ ∞
0
dwN(w, t)
w
WT
log
(
w
WT
)
, (11)
sinceWT =< w > NT , where NT is the total number of agents. Then, the Theil
entropy can be written as:
SW = −
∫ ∞
0
dwN(w, t)
w
〈w〉
log
(
w
〈w〉
)
+ log(NT ), (12)
that is a more appropriate form for numerical purposes. Fig. (7) presents the
evolution of the Theil entropy for different initial conditions and values of γ.
Except for γ = 1, dSW
dt
< 0 for all times. This implies a different second law
for the exchanges defined above. This second law where the entropy decreases
instead of increasing characterizes the wealth concentration process (or conden-
sation) and it is the opposite of the “equipartition of energy” obtained in the
kinetic theory of gases. This point will be discussed in detail below and we will
try to built possible physical systems with a similar behavior.
If the second law of thermodynamics, when applied to the whole universe,
has as a corollary the “thermal death of the universe”, the concentration - or
condensation - of wealth leads to a “thermal death of the market”, since the
market needs exchanges, or flux of capital, to survive. If all agents, with a few
exceptions, have zero wealth, there is almost no exchanges. This can be verified
if we calculate the “liquidity”, or the money being exchanged in the system. We
define the liquidity of the market as the amount of money exchanged per unit
time:
C(t) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
dw′
∫ ∞
0
dw′′N(w′, t)N(w′′, t)
w′w′′
w′ + w′′
(13)
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Figure 7: Time evolution of the entropy for different values of γ and two different initial
conditions.
The liquidity has been numerically calculated for different times and it is rep-
resented in Fig. 8. The liquidity is also a decreasing function of time for γ < 1.
One can argue that this behavior of the W -entropy and of the liquidity are
artifacts because we have considered a wealth conserving system, and this is
not realistic. However, within a very simplified description of the wealth gener-
ation process one can expect that the wealth production should be proportional
to the circulating capital: wealth must be exchanged to generate more wealth.
(Adam Smith said that trade and exchange are emblematic of the nature of
men: “Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone
for another with another dog.” [33]) In this case it is interesting to investigate
the dependence of the total exchanged wealth, C(t), with the wealth distribu-
tion. Wealth concentration is supposed to decrease with W -entropy SW , then,
we represented in Fig. 9 C versus SW for all times and for both initial condi-
tions. The circulating capital is an increasing function of SW , which means that
the more concentrated the wealth is, the smaller wealth production should be
expected, confirming that even for a non-conservative market this alternative
second law is still valid.
4.2. Why the market condenses?
We focus now on the characteristics of the dynamics that explain conden-
sation as the attractor of the evolution equation. The first reason is that the
state of total misery, that is, agents with w = 0, is a trapping state with zero
escaping probability. The second point is that, regardless an agent wealth, the
probability that eventually it approaches w = 0 is non-null. On the other hand,
as wealth is conserved, the accumulation of agents near w = 0 implies few agents
with very large w. To further illustrate this point, we calculated the average
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Figure 8: Evolution of exchanged wealth for different initial conditions and values of γ. It is
possible to observe that it decreases in time, leading to a thermal death of the market
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Figure 9: The liquidity, or circulating capital, C, as function of the wealth entropy SW
for different initial conditions and values of γ. C increases with SW , showing that evenly
distributed wealth leads to higher wealth exchanges.
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probability Q+(w) for an agent with wealth w to increase its wealth in a given
time step, as
Q+(w) =
∫ ∞
0
dw′N(w′, t)pγ(w|w
′)
=
1− γ < tanh(w − w′) >
2
(14)
where < ... > stands for the average over N(w′, t). Assume a wealth distribu-
tion peaked around < w >. For w much lower than the typical values in the
wealth distribution, tanh(w′ − w) approaches −1 when N(w′, t) > 0 and hence
Q+(w) ∼
1+γ
2 . If γ < 1 there is a non zero probability for the agent to loose in
a transaction and of approaching the total misery state. This total misery state
is a financial hell, as once there, in the words of Dante: Lasciate ogni speranza,
voi che entrate, i.e. there are no chances to escape. The wealth distribution will
approach the condensate ‘L’-shape configuration. Only for γ = 1 the dynamics
guarantees that the probability of loosing wealth is zero for the poorest. This
is the one case where the ’L’-solution is not the attractor of the dynamics. The
stationary regime in this model and the condition of conservation of the total
wealth implies that there are a few infinitely rich agents, since there is not a
bound in the maximum possible wealth. As wealth is conserved that implies
many poor agents, and a very unfair wealth distribution.
4.3. Lorenz curves and Gini coefficient
In the previous section we have defined the W -entropy or Theil coefficient.
Another useful and current measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient [31]. To
evaluate this coefficient, we first construct the Lorenz curves by defining x(wZ )
as the fraction of the agent population with wealth lower or equal to wZ , that
is,
x(wZ ) =
∫ wZ
0
N(w, t)dw, (15)
and the fraction of wealth F (wZ) belonging to this population as
F (wZ) =
∫ wZ
0
N(w, t)
w
〈w〉
dw (16)
As both x(wZ ) and F (wZ) are uniquely defined by wZ we may build a function
L(x), called the Lorenz curve, as the fraction of wealth F (wZ) calculated at
a value of wZ that corresponds to the population fraction x. Fig. 10 shows
the time evolution of the Lorenz curves corresponding to the runs with uniform
initial conditions. It is clear from the figure that the Lorenz curves present a
negative curvature whose absolute value increases in time for γ < 1 and, as
one should expect, the limit for t → ∞ is a condensed state, or an almost L-
distribution for zero or a small value of γ, while the share of the wealth is rather
stable and even improves for high values of γ.
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Figure 10: Lorenz curves as a function of time for different values of γ, at different times
The Gini coefficient is defined as [31]
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(x)dx (17)
which gives a measure of how unequal the wealth distribution is: for a distribu-
tion where all agents have the same amount of wealth, N(w, t) = δ(w − 〈w〉),
the Lorenz curve is a straight line such that
∫ 1
0
L(x)dx = 0.5, yielding G = 0.
On the other hand when all wealth belong to just one agent, G = 1. Fig. 11
shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient for the iterations starting from a nor-
mal distribution and from a uniform distribution. The initial value of the Gini
coefficient is higher in the case of the uniform distribution but for t ≃ 1000 time
steps the system already “forgot” the initial conditions and the Gini coefficient
monotonically increases asymptotically approaching 1 for t→∞.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown, both by analytical and numerical methods that exchange
models where the exchange fraction cannot be bigger than the capital of any
of the participants, leads to a condensed state and so, to a state of minimum
entropy, in disagreement with the second law of thermodynamics. However, this
state is a state of equilibrium and a state that represents a kind of thermal dead
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Figure 11: Time evolution of the Gini coefficient. Note that, after a short transient, the Gini
coefficient is a monotonically increasing function of time when γ < 1.
of markets, as no more exchanges are possible when all, or almost all agents
(with the exception of a set of zero measure), have wealth equal to zero. That
means that this kind of exchange rule induces a behavior completely different
of the one predicted by Boltzmann H-theorem. The main difference comes from
the quantity of wealth, (or of the exchanged resource), that the agents can
exchange. As we discussed previously, if the exchange assets are determined
completely at random, the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution is recovered [9]. Also,
if an “unfair” rule of exchange is introduced, for instance allowing one agent
to take all the assets of the other partner, a distribution with a higher Gini
coefficient is obtained and there is no condensed state [30, 14].
Thus, it seems that condensation emerges from the fact that it is impossible
to receive more money that the quantity already owned. What seems to be a fair
exchange rule has the implication of spreading misery. To avoid condensation
and the thermal death of markets some regulation, or some minimum allowance
is necessary to favor the poorer agents. When there are no regulations and/or
when no one can win more than he has, the dynamics leads to a condensed state
and to a frozen economy. This result emphasize the importance of regulations
and also of loans, as they permit to invest more capital than the one owned
by each agent. Also, politics of acting on the poorest agent, as described in an
extremal dynamics model [19], tend to avoid this condensed state.
If one wants to compare this result with the second law of thermodynamics
applied to physical systems, or to thermodynamic models for economic systems
as the ones described, for example, by Mimkes [35] then random or unfair ex-
changes are essential features to recover the second law. This effect may seem
awkward but we can think of physical systems where the exchange rule is similar
to the one proposed here and, indeed, there exist physical systems that behave
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in a similar way. Maybe the best known example are the moderators used
in nuclear reactors, where particular materials are used to thermalize neutrons
transforming a wide distribution of energy into a distribution with a pronounced
peak in the region of energy of interest. One can argue that even if the entropy
of the neutrons decreases, the total entropy of the system increases. That is a
good clue to better understand the behavior of the exchange model for markets.
If the studied exchange model leads to a decrease of entropy and then to an
ordered state of minimum entropy, this is because a) each agent is described by
a single parameter, his wealth, and b) because poor agents have no possibility
of recovery. This last item is important when considering policies to improve
the wealth distribution. Concerning the first item we should be aware that a
pure exchange models provides a limited description of markets and trade, as
they do not consider neither regulatory policies, nor production of goods and
commodities, nor salaries, nor banks, nor debts. The limitation of those models
was extensively discussed by Gallegati et. al. [34]. Nevertheless, in spite of their
simplicity, we think that exchange models capture an essential characteristic of
economical activity, and, in particular, of markets, i.e. accumulation of wealth
in a few hands, on the other hand they show that equilibrium is probably not
an essential ingredient in the description of markets. However, in the same way
that uniform temperature leads a physical system to thermal death, in economic
systems the thermal death is a consequence of a extreme inequality in revenues
and wealth, and we hope to have exhaustively demonstrated this point in this
article.
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